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Abstract—This article presents the results of an experimental 
study where mock-jurors were tasked with interpreting the 
presentation of DNA evidence. The 200 university student 
participants were exposed to one of five murder scenarios where 
the information about the DNA evidence was manipulated. The 
results showed that participants were more likely to convict when 
the DNA match statistic was presented as a probability (0.1%) and 
focused on the defendant, less likely to convict when it was 
presented as a frequency (1 in 1,000) and focused on a broader 
reference group, and even less likely in the control scenario with 
no DNA evidence. The forensic knowledge of participants was also 
explored, and more than three-quarters demonstrated reasonable 
understanding of the individuating capacity of DNA evidence. 
Participants recognized that while DNA has the capacity to 
determine guilt, it is insufficient on its own to convict or acquit. 
The implications for the presentation of expert testimony and 
judicial instruction are canvassed, and the broader ramifications 
for the education of jurors and legal personnel are discussed. 
 
Index Terms—DNA evidence, expert evidence, juror decision-
making, match statistics 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
HE forensic application of DNA has increased the frequency 
of criminal investigations that rely on biological material for 
identification purposes (Goodman-Delahunty & Tait, 2006) 
and this impact clearly carries through into the adjudicative 
setting (Amorim, 2012; Briody, 2003; 2004). Due to its use in 
violent and high profile cases, and its role in overturning 
wrongful convictions, DNA analysis has been considered the 
great panacea for criminal investigations and court proceedings 
(Butler, 2001; Cooper, 2012; Kirby, 2010; Lincoln & Wilson, 
2005; Lynch, 2013). It was once characterized in a  
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US court as “the single greatest advance in the search for the 
truth, and the goal of convicting the guilty and acquitting the 
innocent, since the advent of cross-examination” (New York v  
Wesley, 533 N.Y.S. 2d 643, 644, S. Ct. 1988), and still garners 
such laudatory sentiments. 
It is, of course, difficult to argue against the power of DNA to 
incriminate the guilty, or deny its crucial role in exculpating the 
innocent, but like all powerful tools it has the capacity to 
produce undesirable consequences (Edmond, 2011; Goodman-
Delahunty & Tait, 2006; Kirby, 2010; Langdon & Wilson, 
2005; Lynch, 2013; McCartney, 2006). In the wake of the claim 
last century that little is known “about how laypersons respond 
to DNA evidence” (National Research Council, 1996), the body 
of research in this area has expanded significantly, providing 
knowledge about the weight that legal decision makers assign 
to it in forensic settings (Briody, 2003; 2004; Goodman-
Delahunty & Hewson, 2010; Goodman-Delahunty & 
Wakabayashi, 2012; Findlay, 2008; Koehler, 2001; Koehler & 
Macchi, 2004; Kruse, 2012; Lynch, 2013; Smith & Bull, 2012; 
Smith, et. al., 2011; Wheate, 2006; 2010).  
Studies in Australia demonstrate that there is potential to 
overly rely on DNA (Briody, 2003; 2004). In one jurisdiction, 
it was found that cases of murder and sexual assault that include 
DNA have a higher likelihood of going to trial and a higher 
likelihood of securing a conviction than do cases without this 
type of evidence (Briody, 2003; 2004). Such empirical studies 
raise serious questions about how jury members interpret 
individuating DNA evidence in court. Some research on juror 
comprehension has shown that jury members view DNA 
evidence as very important in determining guilt (Findlay, 
2008). Indeed they claim it to be of greater significance in their 
deliberations than any other type of evidence (Findlay, 2008; 
Wheate, 2010). This extends to the view that jurors are 
“completely intractable and unwilling to even consider a 
conviction” without its presence (Wheate, 2010, p. 135). 
The manner in which DNA evidence is presented at trial can 
have a considerable impact on the way it is interpreted by jurors 
(Koehler, 2001). It has been found that when a DNA statistic is 
framed as a probability (.001) that targets a specific suspect (the 
likelihood that the accused is the source), it is more persuasive 
to a jury than when it is presented as a frequency (one in one 
4218, Australia (phone +617 55952659; fax +617 55952672; e-mail: 
rlincoln@bond.edu.au). 
 
The Persuasive Powers of DNA:  
An Experimental Study in Perceptions of Expert 
Evidence 
Robyn Lincoln, Adam Southerland and Madeleine Jarrett-Luck 
T 
DOI: 10.5176/2251-2853_3.2.153 
Received 27 Dec 2013 Accepted 10 Mar 2014
GSTF International Journal of Law and Social Sciences (JLSS) Vol.3 No.2, April 2014
©The Author(s) 2014. This article is published with open access by the GSTF
20
DOI 10.7603/s4074-014-0002-5
 thousand) and targets a broad reference group (the people of a 
local area). A number of studies have yielded similar findings 
about the interpretation of probabilities and frequencies 
(Koehler, 2013; Konheim-Kalkstein, et. al., 2009; Schklar & 
Diamond, 1999; Slovic, et. al., 2000; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1973). The persuasive power of DNA evidence versus the 
interpretation of the various presentation methods raise 
important issues about how it can best be delivered to juries. 
The current study seeks to update and build upon the works 
of Koehler (2001) and Briody (2003; 2004) by addressing three 
major issues. First it explores whether mock-jurors are more 
inclined to return a guilty verdict in cases involving DNA 
evidence. Secondly, it compares whether mock-jurors assign 
more value to DNA statistics when they are presented as 
probabilities rather than frequencies, with attention paid to 
reference groups. Finally, the study examines the influence that 
background knowledge has on juror assessments of guilt. Other 
research has addressed knowledge about forensic DNA among 
laypersons in relation to improving this knowledge (Goodman-
Delahunty & Hewson, 2010). However, no existing works have 
matched participants’ understandings of DNA evidence with 
the presentation format in which it is delivered and how this 
subsequently impacts on mock-trial verdicts.  
II. OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
Given the increasingly common usage of forensic DNA 
evidence in criminal investigations and trials, it is unsurprising 
to find a rapidly expanding body of empirical research and 
crimino-legal commentary on this topic (Cooper, 2012; Haesler 
& van Daal, 2011; Kirby, 2010; Lynch, 2013). Recent studies 
have focused on how forensic DNA evidence is perceived and 
understood by jurors and legal personnel (Smith, et. al., 2011; 
Smith & Bull, 2012; Dartnall & Goodman-Delahunty, 2006; 
Findlay, 2008; Goodman-Delahunty & Hewson, 2010; Wheate, 
2010). While there seem to be inaccurate understandings about 
DNA by jurors (Briody, 2003; 2004; Dartnall & Goodman-
Delahunty, 2006; Findlay, 2008; Schklar & Diamond, 1999; 
Wheate, 2010), the reasons for this have yet to be confirmed.  
One contributing factor is how this type of forensic evidence 
is presented to jurors in the courtroom. Several studies suggest 
that the manner in which forensic DNA experts deliver their 
findings strongly affects the perceptions by triers of fact (Aarli, 
2012; Amorim, 2012; Bornstein, 2004; de Keijser & Elffers, 
2012; Edmond, 2011; Goodman-Delahunty & Wakabayashi, 
2012; Henderson, 2002; Koehler, 2013; Konheim-Kalkstein, et. 
al., 2009; Kruse, 2012; Ligertwood, 2011; Noordgaard & 
Rasmusson, 2012; Redmayne, 2001). Differences in 
explanations of probabilities and statistics, as well as the use of 
advanced terminology, appear to add to the confusion 
experienced by jurors. In addition, this lack of understanding 
extends to legal personnel — judges, prosecutors and defense 
counsel (Cooper, 2012; Henderson, 2002; Kirby, 2010; Selby, 
2010). Thus the following brief review of the literature focuses 
on two key streams: the perceptions that abound in courtrooms 
about forensic identification evidence; and the manner in which 
forensic experts present their findings at trial. 
A. Perceptions of Forensic DNA Evidence 
Research suggests that the lack of understanding by jurors 
regarding how DNA evidence works and the relevance of 
statistical analyses lead to an unquestioning acceptance of the 
reliability of DNA. A variety of psychologically-focused 
studies and legal commentaries describe this phenomenon and 
assess its impact for potential miscarriages of justice (see 
Amorim, 2012; Cooper, 2012; de Keijser & Elffers, 2012; 
Edmond, 2011; Findlay, 2008; Henderson, 2002; Kirby, 2010; 
Koehler, 2013; Konheim-Kalkstein, et. al., 2009; Kruse, 2012; 
Ligertwood, 2011; Lynch, 2013; Noordgaard & Rasmusson, 
2012; Redmayne, 2001; Selby, 2010; Wheate, 2010). For 
example, in one study jurors claimed that DNA evidence was 
very important as “inculpatory” evidence, but admitted that 
they lacked understanding about DNA processes, error rates, 
and the like (Findlay, 2008). 
Work by other authors continues to establish this theme of 
poor knowledge about forensic DNA evidence by jury members 
(Dartnall & Goodman-Delahunty, 2006; Goodman-Delahunty 
& Hewson, 2010; Goodman-Delahunty & Tait, 2006; 
Henderson, 2002; Wheate, 2006). In one research project about 
improving juror assessments of statistical DNA evidence, 
participants displayed low levels of awareness about this 
evidence type during pre-trial surveys with only a quarter of 
questions being answered correctly (Goodman-Delahunty & 
Hewson, 2010). However, the presence of DNA evidence in a 
criminal case increased the number of guilty verdicts in mock-
trial scenarios despite this lack of knowledge (Goodman-
Delahunty & Hewson, 2010). As a result there is a “near 
impossibility of getting rational people to think that scientific 
(especially DNA) evidence may be inaccurate, inadequate or 
contaminated” (Kirby, 2010, p. 28). 
In addition, the pre-eminence of DNA evidence, partly due to 
its capacity for individuation and its strong probative value 
(Ligertwood, 2011), remains an issue. For example, jurors 
participating in mock trial research tended to fixate on DNA 
evidence, reporting a belief that it was more “important” than 
other evidence types (Wheate, 2010). In evidentiary terms, it is 
seen as more “factual”, infallible and unsusceptible to error than 
other evidence types such as eyewitness accounts (Cooper, 
2012; Lynch, 2013). Further, where DNA evidence was absent, 
participants were less likely to offer guilty verdicts with the 
observation that without DNA evidence “some jurors would 
never say ‘guilty’. They just wanted DNA evidence and 
wouldn’t accept anything less” (Wheate, 2010, p. 135). This 
finding was reflected in a study of Australian and Canadian 
jurors where the lack of forensic DNA evidence provoked 
questioning from participants about its absence (Holmgren & 
Fordham, 2011). 
The unquestioning acceptance of DNA evidence expands 
beyond jurors to legal personnel such as judges, prosecutors and 
defense counsel. There are many cases where prosecution and 
defense have misunderstood the significance of forensic 
evidence provided by expert witnesses, and there are claims that 
“there is a very real danger” of DNA “being abused through 
widespread misunderstanding of the statistical basis of its 
results” (Henderson, 2002, p. 186). 
In contrast, there are findings indicating that jurors can engage 
with many forms of evidence and are able to evaluate DNA in 
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 the context of a given case (Goodman-Delahunty & Hewson, 
2010; Holmgren & Fordham, 2011; Smith, et. al., 2011). It has 
also been found that while the absence of DNA was an issue for 
some jurors, this did not prevent them from carefully 
considering and weighing other types of evidence in their 
deliberations (Holmgren & Fordham, 2011). A significant 
perspective was that jurors “look to see what other aspects of 
the evidence supported or contradicted [expert DNA evidence] 
and assess evidence on that basis” (Holmgren & Fordham, 
2011, p. 70). So, jurors do not necessarily accept DNA at face 
value and are able to assess it in conjunction with other 
evidence types when deliberating (Findlay, 2008; Goodman-
Delahunty & Hewson, 2010; Goodman-Delahunty & 
Wakabayashi, 2012; Holmgren & Fordham, 2011; Kruse, 
2012). 
However, this picture is even more complicated because with 
the increasing inclusion of DNA in criminal trials there has 
been a concomitant decrease in caution by laypersons in 
evaluating this type of evidence (Haesler & van Daal, 2011). 
There is a further muddying of the findings because pre-trial 
biases in favor of the prosecution can encourage greater 
probative value being placed on even very weak forensic 
evidence (Smith & Bull, 2012). And, the manner in which DNA 
is described is important for how jurors evaluate it. Studies have 
identified that jurors use pieces of evidence to formulate a 
“story” of the case in their heads; they tend to be more 
convinced by the same evidence when provided anecdotally 
and in reference to specific cases than when provided in more 
abstract terms (Bornstein, 2004; Kruse, 2012). 
This indicates that the persuasiveness of a lawyer or scientific 
expert in their explanation of the DNA evidence can impact on 
juror perceptions. Recent findings also suggest that the 
increasing trend for criminal trial proceedings to utilize only a 
single forensic expert may discourage the proper consideration 
of DNA evidence during juror deliberation processes 
(Goodman-Delahunty & Wakabayashi, 2012). The mock trial 
study revealed that the presence of separate forensic experts for 
the defense and the prosecution led to stronger engagement with 
forensic testimonial material and a perception of prosecution 
experts as being less persuading than when no expert testified 
for the defense (Goodman-Delahunty & Wakabayashi, 2012). 
 
B. Presentation of DNA in the Courtroom 
The basic science of DNA and its testing is now less in 
question but the manner in which the evidence is presented 
remains under scrutiny (Cooper, 2012; de Keijser & Elffers, 
2012; Koehler, 2013; Ligertwood, 2011; Nordgaard & 
Rasmusson, 2012). The probative value of a DNA match is 
expressed using statistics, ultimately describing certain traits of 
the profile and how common they are in a given population 
(Koehler, 2013; National Academy of Sciences, 2009). 
Probability-style presentation of DNA is the most frequently 
adopted method in the courtroom. The two most universally 
accepted means of presenting probabilistic DNA evidence are 
random match probabilities (RMP) and likelihood ratios (LR) 
(Amorim, 2012; Koehler, 2013; Noordgaard & Rasmusson, 
2012). 
Likelihood ratios are used when there is more than one 
conflicting hypothesis about a piece of DNA evidence (e.g. who 
left a sample at a crime scene); it constitutes a method which 
allows experts to determine how much more or less the 
evidence supports one theory over another (Koehler, 2013; 
Noordgaard & Rasmusson, 2012). The final statistic provided 
in an LR is therefore not a probability in itself, but a ratio of 
probabilities; it “is not a property of the examined individual 
[but] just translates the relative likelihoods of an event — the 
evidence — when explained by two alternative, exhaustive, 
mutually exclusive hypotheses” (Amorim, 2012, p. 264). By 
comparison, RMPs describe the frequency of a DNA profile 
within a given population (Koehler, 2013). A smaller RMP is 
of greater probative value than a larger RMP due to the fact that 
the former indicates a lesser chance that a DNA match is 
coincidental (Koehler, 2013).  
Both these methods of presenting DNA evidence have 
associated drawbacks. Primarily, the difficulty lies in that those 
likely to be empanelled on a jury generally have poor statistical 
reasoning abilities (de Keijser & Elffers, 2012; Findlay, 2008; 
Goodman, 1993; Koehler, 2013; Koehler & Macchi, 2004; 
Ligertwood, 2011; Wheate, 2006). Therefore, when jurors are 
required to review DNA evidence that is explained using 
statistical analyses, it is not clear how such evidence is 
appraised. People often commit errors of reasoning when 
dealing with probabilistic information, and this can result in a 
misinterpretation of DNA evidence findings (Koehler, 2013). 
For example, “if one infers, from an extremely small RMP, that 
the matchee is the source of the evidence, this inference should 
not prompt the additional inference that the matchee must have 
committed the crime in question” (Koehler, 2013, p. 532). 
However, both jurors and legal professionals fall prey to this 
error in statistical reasoning (de Keijser & Elffers, 2012; 
Edmond, 2011; Selby, 2010). 
Lawyers have been found to compound the issue through 
commission of the prosecutor’s fallacy, particularly when the 
RMP is very small (Koehler, 2013; Selby, 2010). It is for this 
reason that some argue against the use of RMPs, suggesting that 
they may be harmful, rather than helpful, when dealing with 
DNA evidence (Aarli, 2012; Koehler, 2013). Unfortunately, 
LRs also suffer the same drawbacks, with research indicating 
that jurors and lawyers have poor comprehension of this type of 
statistical information. For example, it has recently been found 
that proper understandings of LR and related statistical 
concepts were poor among jurors and legal personnel, and that 
many lawyers appeared to commit the prosecutor’s fallacy 
when dealing with such evidence (de Keijser & Elffers, 2012). 
Similarly, it is noted that while LR may be a less misleading 
statistical concept than RMP, there is no indication that jurors 
or lawyers have a more sound understanding of this method 
(Amorim, 2012; Noordgaard & Rasmusson, 2012).  
The flaws inherent in probabilistic presentation of statistical 
DNA evidence have led some authors to recommend the use of 
frequency-style approaches to communicating effectively about 
this evidence to juries and legal personnel. Frequency 
presentation methods are argued to align more closely to the 
human inductive approach to reasoning than probabilistic 
methods (Ligertwood, 2011). To explain forensic DNA 
matches to juries using a frequency format may encourage 
jurors to consider how many people within the suspect pool 
might have matching DNA; this is vital when considering that 
all other potential suspects must be excluded before 
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 determining a defendant’s guilt or innocence (Ligertwood, 
2011; Redmayne, 2001). Recent findings continue to support 
this perspective, with empirical data indicating that jurors tend 
to have poorer reasoning when dealing with probabilistic 
information than with statistical frequencies (Koehler, 2013). 
However, frequency-formatted methods of expressing DNA 
statistics have been found to be less convincing in court than 
probabilistic methods (Konheim-Kalkstein, et. al., 2009). 
III. METHOD 
 
The debate about which of the two approaches is more suited 
to the accurate and effective communication of forensic DNA 
evidence to criminal courts continues, and the present study 
aims to contribute to this discussion. This study adopts an 
experimental approach via manipulations of case study 
information, specifically the format in which DNA evidence is 
presented, or not, to a sample of mock-jurors. The study 
replicates and extends the work of Koehler (2001) by utilizing a 
modified version of his case study of a fatal armed robbery 
(Koehler & Macchi, 2004). The study also takes up the findings 
from the Australian studies (Briody, 2003; 2004) in that the 
design includes a control group for which no specific DNA 
evidence is included in one of the case scenarios. Further, the 
earlier research is extended by the inclusion of questions 
designed to extract additional information about decision-
making by the mock-jurors. 
 
A. Participants 
The sample comprised 200 undergraduate and postgraduate 
university students enrolled in criminology, psychology and 
communications studies. The data show that the majority of 
participants (60%) did not have a background in a justice/legal 
discipline. Almost all participants (98%) stated that they had 
not served on a jury. There were 129 females (65%) and 69 
males (35%) across three main age categories: 18 to 21 years 
(62%), 22 to 30 years (31%), and 31 to 55 years (7%), with an 
average age of 31 years, and a majority who were Australian-
born (56%). 
 
B. Procedure 
The different scenarios and the ways in which the DNA 
evidence was presented are complex (see Figure 1). First, there 
are “single-targets” which focus on a specific individual or 
event, and “multi-targets” which focus on groupings of 
individuals or events (Koehler & Macchi, 2004). In addition 
there are two manipulations of the framing of the DNA statistic, 
either as a “probability” (expressed as 0.1%) or a “frequency” 
(expressed as 1 in 1,000). This yields four possible 
“target/frame” formats. The fifth condition is the control group 
in which only circumstantial evidence (e.g. weapon details and 
alibi information) are presented.  
The “single-target” segment offers a small reference group by 
focusing exclusively on the suspect. Similarly, the “probability 
frame” promotes a “narrow, ‘inside’ view in which instant cases 
are contemplated in isolation” (Koehler, 2001), thus, 
encouraging participants to only consider this defendant’s case 
without reference to related persons or cases. Therefore in 
Scenario 1, for example, the combination (single + probability) 
limits the likelihood that a juror will consider someone else’s 
guilt and thereby increases the likelihood of a guilty verdict 
being returned. By comparison is Scenario 4 that used a “multi-
target” element that encourages the reference of other persons 
and cases by focusing on the grouping of individuals or events. 
When the statistic was framed as a “frequency” the likelihood 
is that this allows jurors to identify others who might match the 
DNA evidence (Koehler, 2001; Slovic, et. al., 2000; Yamagishi, 
1997). 
 
Scenario 
Target/Frame 
Combination 
Example 
1 
single-target 
probability 
frame 
The probability that the suspect would 
match the blood drops if he were not their 
source is 0.1% 
2 
single-target 
frequency 
frame 
The frequency with which the suspect 
would match the blood drops if he were 
not their source is 1 in 1,000 
3 
multi-target 
probability 
frame 
0.1% of the people in the [local area] 
would also match the blood drops 
4 
multi-target 
frequency 
frame 
1 in 1,000 people in the [local area] would 
also match the blood drops 
5 
no DNA 
evidence 
Eyewitness identification, physical 
evidence and limited alibi only 
Figure 1: Target and frame formats across the five study conditions. 
 
It was hypothesized that Scenario 1 would yield more guilty 
verdicts; that Scenario 4 would yield more not-guilty verdicts; 
that Scenarios 2 and 3 would probably be conflated and 
therefore participants’ responses would be mixed; and that the 
mock-jurors in the four experimental conditions would be 
inclined to return a guilty verdict compared with those in the 
control group. 
The instrument (a three-page questionnaire) contained brief 
details of a murder that took place during an attempted armed 
robbery set in the local area (cf Koehler, 2001). The remainder 
of the instrument included questions targeted towards the 
defendant’s involvement in the crime and participants were 
asked to provide a verdict and an explanation as to how they 
arrived at that verdict. For the qualitative data, three 
independent raters were tasked to engage in post-hoc analyses. 
From this it was determined that there were nine categories 
justifying not-guilty verdicts, and five categories justifying 
guilty verdicts. These questions serve to operationalize whether 
there is a relationship between the persuasiveness of DNA 
evidence and the formats in which they are presented. 
There were also questions aimed to measure participants’ 
knowledge of DNA evidence and its capabilities. Included was 
a question intended to determine, based on a given population 
and DNA match statistic, if participants were able to ascertain 
the number of people who were not the source of evidence but 
would still provide a DNA match with the recovered blood 
evidence. The instruments were distributed via random 
allocation to volunteer participants in university classroom 
settings. 
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 IV. RESULTS 
 
Despite the larger proportion of female participants there were 
no overall differences between the sexes on responses to the 
major questions (verdict, views on DNA, knowledge, etc), even 
though females were disproportionately (albeit randomly) 
assigned to the experimental conditions of Scenarios 3 and 4. 
Similarly, with age there appeared to be no bias in responses 
because of the age distributions across the various groups. The 
only exception was where those who nominated a guilty verdict 
and were in the youngest age group (18 to 21) opted for reasons 
other than the DNA evidence. And, it should be emphasized 
here that the research hypotheses were not focused on age or 
gender factors.  
A not-guilty verdict was given by almost three-quarters of the 
sample. Of the 145 participants who gave a not-guilty verdict 
31% stated it was because there was “no corroborating 
evidence”. For example, one open-ended response coded in this 
category was: “while DNA evidence is a significant aspect of 
any criminal investigation, it cannot be relied upon by itself to 
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”. An additional 21% of 
participants who provided a not-guilty verdict stated that the 
evidence of the expert witness was not strong enough. As for 
guilty verdicts, 35% of this group claimed the “blood match 
evidence” to be the basis of their decision, and as one 
participant wrote: “I believe the blood DNA evidence to be very 
reliable and the chances of the DNA evidence being wrong is 
less than the chance of an eyewitness being wrong”. Other 
participants in this category focused on the expert testimony 
stating there was “strong statistical evidence provided by the 
expert witness”. Of note is that across all groups DNA was 
deemed to have a low error rate where 51% of all participants 
responded that there would be fewer than 2 errors in 100 DNA 
match analyses.  
The next set of results applies only to the experimental groups 
(n=160). The first question required participants to provide the 
probability (as a percent) for which they believed the suspect to 
be the source of the blood evidence p(source), which yielded a 
modal response of 99.9%. Participants in the experimental 
conditions were also asked to provide the probability in which 
they believed the suspect committed the crime — p(guilt). The 
most frequent estimates were 50 (31%) or 90 (13%) percent. 
When participants were asked to extrapolate the likely matches 
to people in the local area 40% of those who answered this 
question produced a correct answer. The cross-tabulation 
revealed that answers to Scenario 1 were significantly different 
to those of Scenarios 2, 3 and 4 (p=.000) which contained more 
than four times the number of correct answers as did Scenario 
1. 
The experimental groups responded to a series of question 
aimed to measure their knowledge about DNA evidence and its 
capabilities. The first three questions specifically addressed the 
individuating capacity of DNA: 78% agreed that a DNA 
analysis could reveal a person’s gender; 80% affirmed that 
blood relatives have similar DNA structures; whereas 75% 
responded that identical twins did not share the same DNA 
profile. Further when asked if a DNA profile was obtainable 
from a urine sample: 53% disagreed; 85% agreed that blood, 
saliva and semen samples taken from the same person would 
give the same DNA profile; whereas 52% affirmed that human 
hair without the root could be analyzed for DNA. These results 
suggest that the majority of participants possess reasonable 
knowledge of DNA and its capabilities. 
The findings relating to participants’ confidence in DNA 
evidence were: 54% of the sample agreed that DNA evidence 
can tell if a person is innocent or guilty; and 76% disagreed that 
DNA evidence alone was enough to acquit or convict a person. 
For the questions that were only asked of the control group 
(n=40), participants were asked whether or not the case should 
have gone to trial with 58% concurring. If participants 
responded no they were asked to provide other forms of 
evidence that would have made the case more suitable for 
adjudication. Here they provided multiple responses, with the 
majority being video surveillance and DNA evidence, and 
minority responses of fingerprint, multiple witnesses and 
medical evidence. 
The guilty verdicts across the experimental groups were 
Scenario 1 (62%), Scenario 2 (68%), Scenario 3 (62%) and 
Scenario 4 (85%). However, as hypothesized, the results 
showed that participants’ estimates of p(source) — probability 
of the suspect being the source of the blood evidence, and 
p(guilt) — probability that the suspect was guilty of the murder, 
varied according to target and frame format. A greater 
proportion of participants in the “single-target-probability 
frame” condition responded with higher estimates of p(source) 
and p(guilt) — 74% and 68% respectively — than did jurors in 
the “multi-target frequency frame” condition — 46% and 48% 
respectively. 
In addition, results for p(source) were recoded into two 
categories: 0 to 98% and 99 to 100% to reflect the distributions 
of responses, and it showed that the proportion significantly 
decreased in the Scenario 4 “multi-target frequency-frame” 
format (p=.002). As illustrated in Table 1, a cross-tabulation of 
the recoded data and the four experimental conditions 
demonstrated that the proportions of subjects who were 99% 
certain that the suspect was the source of the blood evidence in 
the recoded data were 42%, 22% and 35% in Scenarios 1, 2 and 
3 versus 8% in Scenario 4. 
 
Scenario  p(source)=<=99% p(source)=>=99% 
Single-target 
Probability frame (scenario 1) 
Frequency frame (scenario 2) 
Multi-target 
Probability frame (scenario 3) 
Frequency frame (scenario 4) 
58 
78 
 
65 
92 
42 
22 
 
35 
8 
Table 1: Probability of being the source of blood evidence, more or 
equal to 99% by scenario (n=160). 
 
It was hypothesized that Scenarios 2 and 3 would conflate and 
the verdicts returned under these conditions would cluster in the 
middle of the more extreme scenarios but this did not occur. 
Rather, the distribution of verdicts in Scenarios 2 and 3 
resemble those of Scenario 1, with guilty results comprising 
38%, 32%, 38% and 15% respectively across all four scenarios. 
These results support one of the main hypotheses in that 
significantly more participants returned a guilty verdict in cases 
involving DNA evidence (p=.048). When given the case 
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 without DNA (Scenario 5) 85% of participants returned not-
guilty verdicts compared to only 70% of participants returning 
not-guilty verdicts in the four experimental scenarios with DNA 
evidence. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Probability estimates provided by mock-jurors confirmed 
that when presented with “single-target probability frame” the 
mean estimate that the suspect was the source of the blood 
evidence was higher than when presented with the “multi-target 
frequency-frame”. Likewise, participants’ verdicts 
demonstrated that fewer jurors in the first condition returned a 
not-guilty verdict than did those in the latter. These results 
concur with recommendations by Ligertwood (2011, p. 487) 
that a frequency presentation “that emphasizes the possibilities 
of an innocent explanation” is essential. 
An explanation can be found in “exemplar cueing theory” 
and the “availability heuristic”. Exemplar cueing theory 
suggests that people judge the probative value of a match 
according to the ease in which they can imagine others who also 
fit the match (Koehler, 2001), and the availability heuristic 
holds that people make judgments concerning the probability or 
frequency of an event based on their knowledge of similar past 
events (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Thus, jurors who were 
given limited reference to other scenarios by focusing on the 
suspect were more inclined to return guilty verdicts. On the 
other hand, jurors who were given a large reference group by 
inferring the potential culpability of others were more inclined 
to return not-guilty verdicts. 
The surprising finding was that Scenarios 2 and 3 which 
contained one segment that encouraged the reference of other 
persons and events and the other element that discouraged the 
reference of other persons and events still tended to infer guilt. 
A central focus of this study suggested that more jurors would 
return a guilty verdict in cases involving DNA evidence and the 
analysis indeed revealed that twice the proportion of 
participants presented with DNA evidence returned guilty 
verdicts (see Briody, 2003; 2004). 
There are various explanations that could identify why DNA 
evidence was a predictor of guilty verdicts; here three reasons 
will be put forward. First, it is possible that participants attached 
inappropriate or undue weight to the DNA evidence, 
considering it credible only because it is science; “as if the aura 
of science automatically confers trustworthiness” (Rudin & 
Inman, 2002, p. 5). Another reason draws from research 
suggesting that jurors have difficulty understanding and 
discerning the significance of DNA evidence (Dartnall & 
Goodman-Delahunty, 2006; Findlay, 2008; Goodman-
Delahunty & Tait, 2006; Henderson, 2002; Wheate, 2006). It is 
possible that participants in this study experienced difficulty 
comprehending the DNA match probability provided, and pre-
existing beliefs regarding DNA may have encouraged the guilty 
verdict. A third reason could be that the probability of the 
defendant’s guilt was determined by or based on the rarity of 
the DNA match statistic provided in the expert testimony and 
subsequently the strengths of other evidence was ignored — 
otherwise known as the “prosecutor’s fallacy” (Thompson & 
Schumann, 1987). This type of fallacious reasoning occurs 
where jurors (and sometimes lawyers) interpret the random 
match probability as the probability of the defendant being 
innocent (Koehler, 2013).  
Another area of importance in this study was the examination 
of participants’ knowledge of DNA and its capabilities. Thus, 
questions were asked attempting to measure participants’ 
knowledge of the individuating capacity of DNA evidence as 
well as knowledge of biological evidence. More than three-
quarters of participants expressed knowledge in response to two 
of the three questions regarding the individuating capacity of 
DNA evidence such as the question asking whether gender can 
be determined through DNA analysis. Likewise, the majority of 
participants expressed knowledge in two out of three questions 
pertaining to biological evidence such as the capacity of human 
hair without the root to be analyzed for purposes of obtaining a 
DNA profile. Overall, participants displayed a positive 
appraisal of the capabilities of DNA and the majority agreed 
that DNA evidence has the capacity to determine guilt, but by 
itself is insufficient to acquit or convict. 
VI. FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The potential explanations for where participants acquire 
their knowledge of DNA and its capabilities present avenues for 
future study. Research could aim to examine the main sources 
of knowledge of DNA evidence for participants and how a 
given source influences the accuracy of an individual’s 
understanding of DNA. Further studies could examine whether 
instructing juries prior to their participation in a criminal trial 
has a positive effect on the accuracy of jurors’ understanding of 
the workings of DNA evidence (Goodman, 1993). Such 
research could have significant implications for trial practices, 
especially in regard to decreasing the potential for miscarriages 
of justice.  
The results of the present study have a number of 
implications for the presentation of DNA evidence to juries in 
criminal trials (Redmayne, 2001). The use of single-target 
versus multi-target frames in particular was demonstrated to 
have notable influence on jurors’ perceptions of a defense case, 
and these findings indicate a need to assess which of these 
frames is appropriate when presenting DNA evidence to lay 
audiences. Areas of focus might include whether either the 
single- or multi-target frame should be used for all criminal 
trials or whether the appropriateness of each approach should 
be assessed on an individual, case-by-case basis.  
The current study also supports prior research by Ligertwood 
(2011) and Wheate (2010) in that jurors involved were 
substantially more likely to return a guilty verdict if DNA 
evidence was present in a trial. The implications of such 
findings underscore the importance jurors place on DNA and 
by extension beg the question of whether criminal justice 
participants can convict a defendant based on this type of 
evidence alone. Such issues have serious ethical and legal 
ramifications that criminal justice personnel are currently 
debating. The results of the present study corroborate prior 
research and draw attention to the need for clarification as to 
whether a defendant must be acquitted if DNA is the only 
evidence against them (see Aytugrul v The Queen [2012] HCA 
15, 18 April 2012). 
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 A final implication is in regard to how prosecutors and 
forensic experts should present DNA evidence to juries. 
Presenting DNA evidence in either a probabilistic manner as 
opposed to using a frequency approach had a significant impact 
on the percentage of jurors who returned guilty verdicts. These 
effects were most notable for Scenario 4, (multi-target, 
frequency format), and Scenario 3 (multi-target, probability 
format), where the number of jurors returning a guilty verdict 
was more than doubled when the DNA statistical evidence was 
presented in a probabilistic format rather than a frequency 
format. As with the single- and multi-target format question, the 
possibility of adopting a universal approach to either 
probabilistic or frequency-based styles of presenting DNA 
evidence is still a matter of consideration. The findings 
presented here provide additional contributions to the current 
deliberations about the ways in which such evidence can be 
delivered to jurors in order to minimise the potential for 
miscarriages of justice.  
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